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Abstract
We analyze the benefits of network sharing between telecommunications operators. Sharing
is seen as one way to speed the roll out of expensive technologies such as 5G since it allows the
service providers to divide the cost of providing ubiquitous coverage. Our theoretical analysis
focuses on scenarios with two service providers and compares the system dynamics when they
are competing with the dynamics when they are cooperating. We show that sharing can be
beneficial to a service provider even when it has the power to drive the other service provider
out of the market, a byproduct of a non-convex cost function. A key element of this study is an
analysis of the competitive equilibria for both cooperative and non-cooperative 2-person games
in the presence of (non-convex) cost functions that involve a fixed cost component.
1 Introduction
As communication technologies become increasingly complex, Service Providers (SPs) need to make
ever larger investments in order to bring the latest network generation to their end users. As one
way to defray these costs, SPs are looking at network sharing agreements that allow them to
upgrade their networks more quickly at lower cost. For example, it has been observed that the
most lucrative 10% of mobile access markets already account for over 50% of an SP’s revenues
whereas the remaining 90% of the markets are “subsidized” by those [12]. Network sharing is
especially attractive in the less profitable regions since it minimizes the investment that SPs need
to make there.
Network sharing can take many forms depending on the assets that are shared. In the most
extreme case the entire network is shared. For this case the only way in which the SPs can
distinguish themselves is via different service plans. The actual network performance will be the
same for both SPs. In less extreme cases only parts of the network will be shared. Examples
include one or more of real-estate sharing, tower sharing, RAN (radio access network) sharing and
core network sharing. Sharing of such inactive elements is becoming increasingly popular. In China
the three major operators have formed a joint venture to share the towers that host their radio
equipment [3].
In this work we focus on two service providers and derive a model to help understand the
implications of network sharing. We wish to understand both the implications for the profit of
the SPs as well as the prices faced by the end users. We note that network sharing is a topic of
interest to regulators since it can affect the competitive make-up of a market. A regulator may
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wish to make sure that prices do not rise excessively before signing off on a sharing agreement. We
incorporate the effects of such a regulator into our analysis.
The main question we ask is: How does network pricing and capacity provisioning differ in the
case that the SPs cooperate versus the case that they compete? In general, we show that sharing
can be beneficial for a wide range of network parameters. In particular:
• We show that a sharing strategy can generate significantly higher profits for the service
providers than if they compete and act according to a Nash equilibrium strategy.
• We demonstrate that in some situations this gain due to sharing holds, even if a service
provider has the market power to drive the other service provider out of the market.
For the case of not sharing, we analyze the competition between the service providers both for the
case in which providers decide on how much capacity to deploy (which gives rise to a Nash-Cournot
game). In the Appendix we also study the case in which providers decide on the price they offer to
the market (which gives rise to a Bertrand game). A key difficulty is that in many situations service
providers have a fixed cost component for entering a market which gives rise to a non-convex cost
function. Competition in this setting is non-standard and leads to a potential situation in which
one provider can drive the other out of the market. Analyzing how this occurs is a key component
of our analysis.
1.1 Problem variants
Figure 1: A schematic of the problem variants that we consider.
Much of the paper will focus on the dynamics and outcomes of a given competitive or collabo-
rative scenario. Once those scenarios are established we can determine whether or not an SP would
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be better off entering into a sharing agreement or going it alone. However, there are many types of
competitive or cooperative arrangements that each lead to different results for the SPs. We begin
by giving a high-level description of the different regimes that can arise. These can be categorized
in a hierachical manner as shown in Figure 1.
At a high level each SP needs to determine whether to compete with the other SP or whether
to cooperate with it. For the case that SPs decide to compete there are two types of competition,
a Bertrand game in which the SPs each offer their own price and the end users react accordingly,
and a Cournot game in which each SP offers a certain capacity into the market and the market
price is set accordingly.
The Cournot game admits a number of possible variations. First of all, depending on the
problem parameters, there may or may not be a Nash equilibrium solution for the SPs. If there is
a Nash equilibrium solution, then two situations can arise. In one of them there is a regulator that
forces the end user price to be the one determined by the equilibrium solution. In the other there
is no regulator and so each SP has to decided whether to play the equilibrium solution. The reason
it might not do so is that depending on the cost parameters an SP might have the ability to force
the other SP out of the market, i.e. it can play a strategy such that the other SP has no incentive
to participate in the market. However, that is a risky strategy in that if both SPs try it then they
could both be worse off than playing the equilibrium solution. We remark that the ability of one
SP to drive the other out of the market arises solely because of the fixed component in the cost
that leads to a non-convex cost function.
Our remaining analysis considers the situation when SPs cooperate and share their networks.
For this case there are variants depending on whether there is a regulator that can enforce price
limits. If there is a regulator then we assume that the end user price is forced to be the same as
it would be if the SPs were competing according to a Cournot game. If there is no such regulator
then we assume that the SPs can set prices as if the combined entity were a monopoly.
The remaining decisions refer to how the profits are shared when the two SPs cooperate. We
assume that this depends on whether or not both SPs are credible players, i.e. whether or not
they can legitimately offer service by themselves. If one SP deems that the other is not credible,
then it would look to take the vast majority of the profit for itself. If both SPs can credibly offer
service on their own, then we assume that profits in the sharing scenario are divided up according
to appropriate schemes, (e.g. based on Shapley value).
1.2 Paper Organization
In Section 2 we define the models that we use throughout the paper and we outline the equations
that define optimal demand and price for a monopolistic SP. In Section 3 we explore the dynamics
for a prototypical example in a single geographic region. By starting with a concrete example we
can better understand the fundamental dynamics at play rather than getting bogged down in the
general equations (which can become somewhat complex). For this example we consider most of
the regimes outlined in Figure 1.
In Section 4 we outline our results for the general case with much of the detailed analysis deferred
to the Appendix. In particular, in Appendix A we present a more detailed study of the Cournot
game in which the providers compete via deployed capacity. In particular, we derive the equations
that characterize the Nash Equilibrium if it exists under our non-convex cost functions. We also
examine the conditions under which one SP can drive the other out of the market. In Appendix B
we determine the SP profits that arise when they enter into a sharing agreement. These profits are
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determined by how the combined profit is shared. This is calculated via two notions of Shapley
value (one of which is based on the notion of “Shapley value with externalities”.) We also explore
a regulatory framework that enforces Nash prices so that end users are not penalized in the sharing
scenario. Lastly, we examine how an SP would approach a sharing agreement if it does not deem the
other SP to be a credible competitor, i.e. if it does not believe the other SP has the cost structure
to operate a network on its own.
In Appendix C we analyze the dynamics when the competitive setting is modeled as a Bertrand
game. The analysis of the Bertrand game is in general simpler than the corresponding Cournot
analysis. This is because in a Bertrand game the SP with the better cost structure always has
the ability to drive the other SP out of the market. In addition to the basic Bertrand game we
study a number of variants. In one of them the SPs are able to share network costs but they must
still compete on price. In another variant only a subset of the end users are deemed to be price
conscious.
In Appendix D we extend our analysis to a situation where a priori the SPs offer service in
different geographic regions. This is an especially attractive situation for network sharing since it
allows each SP to offer service over the entire market more rapidly.
1.3 Previous Work
The GSM Association wrote an influential report [4] examining the ways in which wireless infras-
tructure can be shared. This report describes some existing sharing agreements that are already
in place and discusses the economic and regulatory implications. In [5], Janssen et al. discuss the
statistical multiplexing gains that can be obtained by combining capacity in a network sharing
arrangement. The economics of the Chinese tower sharing agreement mentioned earlier were ana-
lyzed by Deng et al. in [3]. Malanchini and Gruber studied small cell sharing in [7] and presented
ways in which operators could still differentiate themselves (e.g. via power management) even if
all network resources are shared. The papers [1, 6, 8, 13] discuss ways in which network sharing
could be realized in practice. In particular, [6] discusses a technique known as “network slicing”
in which the resource allocation algorithms at wireless basestations reserve a fraction of resources
for each SP. The general economics literature contains many analyses of duopolies with various
cost structures (e.g. [11]). However, to the best of our knowledge previous work has not considered
Cournot competition for network providers under non-concave cost functions with fixed costs, and
there has not been a comparison of how the dynamics under sharing compare to the competitive
dynamics.
2 Cost Model
We consider two Service Providers (SPs) that we denote SP1 and SP2. We begin with a single
geographical region in which both SPs operate. If SP i serves demand1 of size qi then its cost is
given by,
Ci(qi) =
{
αi + βiqi qi > 0
0 qi = 0
,
1Throughout this paper we employ a coarse measure of demand, namely bytes per month across the whole region.
Although this is coarse, the expenses of an operator are closely tied to that number. We also assume that demand is
based on a single price for each operator. In reality each operator offers multiple data plans with different sizes and
costs. We leave the incorporation of different data plans into our analysis as an interesting direction for future work.
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for some parameters αi > 0, βi ≥ 0. The parameter αi reflects a fixed cost, e.g. the cost of
infrastructure such as buildings or spectrum, whereas the parameter βi reflects the cost of serving
a unit of demand, e.g. the cost of deploying equipment.
The level of demand in the region (denoted q) is closely related to the price offered to the end
users (denoted p). Our assumption is that all users in the region are price conscious. In particular,
we assume that the market is elastic with elasticity coefficient ε greater than 1, i.e. q(p) = Qp−ε, for
some parameter Q (quantity sold at unit price). Roughly speaking this means that a 1% reduction
in price results in an (ε−1)% increase in revenue. We note that a change in the demand can reflect
both a change in the number of end users creating that demand as well as a change in the demand
per end user.
If SP i serves demand qi > 0 at price pi then it receives a profit given by, Πi = qipi − Ci(qi) =
qipi − (αi + βiqi). We observe that the fixed cost αi makes the cost function non-convex which
distinguishes our analysis from many previous studies of network economics. In particular, if αi  0
then SP i may not wish to participate in the market because even as a monopolist it is unable to
make a profit. If this decision is due to the capacity (Cournot) or price (Bertrand) offered by the
other SP then we say that SP i is driven out of the market.
Lemma 1. Under monopoly pricing we have,
pmon = εβ/(ε− 1), qmon = Q(εβ/(ε− 1))−ε
Πmon = Q
(
(
εβ
ε− 1)
1−ε − β( εβ
ε− 1)
−ε
)
− α.
assuming that Πmon ≥ 0. (If not then the SP stays out of the market.)
The proof (which is standard) is given in Appendix E.
3 Narrative for a single example
We begin by exploring the dynamics for a prototypical example. In this way we can better under-
stand the fundamental dynamics at play rather than getting bogged down in the general equations
(which can become somewhat complex). In later sections we consider the general case (with much
of the proofs and derivations deferred to the Appendix).
For our example the unit of demand is a PB and the unit of price is $1M. For these units the
price elasticity function has parameters ε = 1.25 and Q = 1000. The per-unit capacity costs are
β1 = $2.5M for SP1 and β2 = $2M for SP2 per petabyte (PB) of wireless capacity. The fixed
capacity costs (representing the cost of participating in the market, e.g., for buying spectrum or
building cell towers) are α1 = $50M and α2 = $100M . For these parameters, the monopoly price,
demand and profit for each operator is given by,
pmon1 = $12.5M, q
mon
1 = 42.6PB, Π
mon
1 = $376M
pmon2 = $10.0M, q
mon
2 = 56.2PB, Π
mon
2 = $350M
3.1 Network Sharing
We first examine the situation under network sharing. This is the easiest case to consider since
we do not need to worry about the competitive dynamics between the SPs. In particular the SPs
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cooperate and use the lowest cost parameters that are available, i.e.
Ccoop(q) = αmin + βminq,
where αmin = min{α1, α2} and βmin = min{β1, β2}. (See Figure 2 for a depiction of Ccoop(q) in
comparison to C1(q) and C2(q).)
Figure 2: The cost function Ccoop(q) compared against C1(q) and C2(q).
We assume that the combined entity is able to use monopoly pricing. In this case the combined
price, demand and profit for our running example is given by,
pcoop = $10.0M, qcoop = 56.2PB, Πcoop = $400M
It remains to determine how the profit is split between the SPs. A natural way to do this is via
the Shapley value which gives to SP i its expected contribution to the coalition assuming that the
SPs create the coalition in a random order. If we assume that the first SP to enter the coalition
can utilize monopoly pricing then the profits are given by,
Πcoop1 =
1
2
(Πmon1 + Π
coop −Πmon2 ) = $213M,
Πcoop2 =
1
2
(Πmon2 + Π
coop −Πmon1 ) = $187M.
In order for an SP to determine whether network sharing is the best option, it needs to compare
its profits under sharing with its profits for the case in which it competes with the other SP. As
mentioned in Section 1, there are many notions of competition - a Cournot game in which the
SPs offer capacity to the market and the market sets the price, and a Bertrand game in which the
SPs directly offer prices to the market. We begin by examining the Cournot game and defer the
corresponding analysis of the Bertrand game to the Appendix.
3.2 Cournot Game
In the Cournot game SP i offers to serve demand qi and then the market determines a common
price p based on q1 and q2. In particular,
p =
(
q1 + q2
Q
)−1/ε
.
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Figure 3: (Left) The best response for each SP given the actions of the other SP. (Middle) The
profits of the two SPs as a function of q1 (assuming SP2 plays the best response). (Right) The
profits of the two SPs as a function of q2 (assuming SP1 plays the best response). The vertical
lines represent the Nash-Cournot solution (q1 = 80, q2 = 112).
The main complication with the Cournot game in our setting is the presence of the αi terms that
introduce a discontinuity into the profit functions. If SP i cannot generate a positive profit for any
value qi > 0 then it will simply set qi = 0 and accept zero profit. In this case we say that SP i is
driven out of the market.
Figure 3 (left) illustrates the behavior of the Cournot game. The plot shows the best response
for each SP, given the actions of the other SP. In particular, for any value q1 > 0 (on the x-axis),
the green dashed curve represents the value of q2 (on the y-axis) that maximizes the profit of SP2
assuming that the action of SP1 is q1.
The blue solid curve is similar and represents the best response for SP1 but with the axes
flipped. In particular, for any value q2 (on the y-axis), the blue curve represents the value of q1 (on
the x-axis) that maximizes the profit of SP1 assuming that the action of SP2 is q2.
The crossing point of the curves at (q1, q2) = (80, 112) represents a Nash equilibrium. (A closed
form expression for this equilbrium is presented in Appendix A.) In other words, if the action of
SP1 is q1 = 80 then the optimal action of SP2 is q2 = 112 and if the action of SP2 is q2 = 112 then
the optimal action of SP1 is q1 = 80. At this point the full set of quantity, price and profit values
is given by,
pNC1 = $3.75M, q
NC
1 = 80PB, Π
NC
1 = $50M
pNC2 = $3.75M, q
NC
2 = 112PB, Π
NC
2 = $96M.
3.3 The impact of a regulator
As we will discuss shortly, the profits for each SP in the sharing scenario are significantly higher
than they are in the competitive scenario. One main reason for this is that in the sharing case the
combined entity is able to set a monopoly price. The profit increase therefore comes at the expense
of the end users who have to pay higher prices. A regulator may deem this to be anti-competitive
and as a result may impose an upper bound on the price that the combined entity can charge if the
two SPs decide to share. A natural candidate for this upper bound is the price corresponding to the
Nash Equilibrium that we computed in the previous section. Sharing can still be beneficial even if
a regulator restricts the price because the combined entity can take advantage of the reduced cost
function. (See Figure 2.) Moreover, in contrast to the full competitive case of Section 3.2 the SPs
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will share profits according to Shapley value and so we have,
preg = pNC1 = $3.75M, q
reg = qNC1 + q
NC
2 = 192PB,
Πreg = pregqreg − (αmin + βminqreg) = $286M
This combined profit is shared via Shapley value and results in,
Πreg1 = $120M, Π
reg
2 = $166M
3.4 Comparison of network sharing and the Cournot game
In the table in Figure 4 we summarize the price p and the profits Π1,Π2 for the case that the
SPs compete according to the Nash Equilibrium of the Cournot game (the so-called Nash-Cournot
solution), as well as the cases of network sharing with and without a regulator. We see that for
the case of network sharing without a regulator, both SPs have significantly higher profit than in
the Nash-Cournot solution but this is partly because they can charge a monopoly price to the end
users. In the case that a regulator enforces an upper bound on price equal to the Nash-Cournot
price, both SPs still obtain a higher profit with network sharing than in the Nash-Cournot solution.
This latter effect comes from the fact that the SPs can share the cost of the network and utilize
the cost parameters αmin, βmin rather than αi, βi.
price per PB, p profits (Π1,Π2)
Nash-Cournot 3.75 (50, 96)
Sharing (no regulator) 10 (213,187)
Sharing (regulator) 3.75 (120,166)
Figure 4: The price p and the SP profits (Π1,Π2) due to the Nash-Cournot solution and the sharing
scenarios. All quantities are in units of $1M.
3.5 Aggressive and submissive strategies
We now address the more complex dynamics that can arise due to the fact that αi > 0. In
particular, we ask whether the SPs will be motivated to conform to the Nash-Cournot solution or
whether they might be tempted to deviate from that action. Note that both the blue and the green
curves hit zero in Figure 3 (left), i.e. both SPs have the ability to drive the other one out of the
market.
Figure 3 further illustrates why the temptation to deviate from the Nash equilibrium might
exist. In particular, Figure 3 (middle) shows the profits of the two SPs given a fixed value of q1.
More precisely, for each value of q1, the solid blue and dashed green curves show the profits of SP1
and SP2 respectively, if SP2 plays its optimal response. We see that there is a big discontinuity in
the profit of SP1. At the point (q1 = 154) at which SP1 drives SP2 out of the market, the optimal
response of SP2 jumps from a non-zero value to zero. This means there is less capacity available
which in turn drives up the price and hence the profit of SP1. Note however that it cannot claim
the monopoly profit since it cannot reduce to the monopoly point q1 = 42.6 without letting SP2
back into the market.
However, Figure 3 (right) shows that this process could work the other way round as well. In
particular, this figure shows the profits of the two SPs given a fixed value of q2. For each value
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of q2, the solid blue and dashed green curves show the profits of SP1 and SP2 respectively, if SP1
plays its optimal response. This time we see a big jump in the profit of SP2 at the point at which
it drives SP1 out of the market.
As a result, each SP could benefit if it sets its qi at a level that drives the other SP out of
the market and the other SP acquiesces to being driven out. We can therefore model the game by
assuming that the SPs have the following discrete choices.
• Nash-Cournot: In this case each SP assumes that the other SP will compete in the market
in which case it makes sense to play the Nash equilibrium value.
• Aggression: An aggressive SP will play at a level that drives the other SP out of the market.
• Submission: A submissive SP will accept being shut out of the market (rather than fighting
it and potentially taking a loss).
• Sharing: An SP can offer to enter a sharing arrangement with the other SP. However, the
arrangement only goes into effect if both SPs agree to it. If both SPs do agree then we obtain
the profits presented in Section 3.1 (that depend on whether or not a regulator caps the price
p).
Sharing Sharing
(SP1 profit,SP2 profit) Nash-Cournot Aggression Submission (no regulator) (regulator)
Nash-Cournot (50, 96) (-1,80) (353,0) NA NA
Aggression (9,-1) (-48,-17) (254,0) NA NA
Submission (0,321) (0,271) (0,0) NA NA
Sharing (no regulator) NA NA NA (213,187) NA
Sharing (regulator) NA NA NA NA (120,166)
Figure 5: The profits (Π1,Π2) due to the different strategy combinations. The rows represent the
decisions for SP1 and the columns represent the decisions for SP2.
The table in Figure 5 shows the outcomes of the resulting game. The columns represent the
decisions for SP1 and the rows represent the decisions for SP2. The entries have the form (SP1
profit, SP2 profit). The profits due to sharing are included in the bottom right corner of the table.
Since sharing only takes place if both parties agree to share, there is no entry in the table if only
one SP is sharing.
We remark that the italicized entries (where one SP plays the Nash-Cournot strategy and the
other plays the Submission strategy) are not viable outcomes because the submissive SP would
be better off playing the Nash-Cournot strategy as well. From the above we can conclude the
following.
• Network sharing is better for both SPs than the Nash-Cournot solution
• If sharing does not take place then the Nash-Cournot solution is a unique Nash equilibrium
since that is the only point at which both curves cross in Figure 3 (left).
• An SP might be tempted to deviate from the Nash-Cournot solution since if it aggressive
then the best response of the other SP is to be submissive in which case the aggressive SP
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will do even better than sharing. (We note that this is not a Nash equilibrium since if one
SP sets qi = 0 then the best response of the other SP is to set q3−i = qmon3−i .)
• The downside of aggression is that if both SPs are aggressive then they both make negative
profit and hence are worse off (as in standard games of chicken). Whether or not an SP will
choose to be aggressive will largely depend on how it expects the other SP to react.
4 General Analysis
As mentioned earlier, most of our general analysis is deferred to the Appendices. However, in
the following we state our main results for the case of network sharing compared with a Cournot
competition.
For the case of sharing the combined price, demand and profit is given by,
pcoop = εβmin/(ε− 1)
qcoop = Q(εβmin/(ε− 1))−ε
Πcoop = pcoopqcoop − (αmin + βminqcoop),
where αmin = min{α1, α2} and βmin = min{β1, β2}. The profit is shared according to,
Πcoop1 =
1
2
(Πmon1 + Π
coop −Πmon2 ) (1)
Πcoop2 =
1
2
(Πmon2 + Π
coop −Πmon1 ), (2)
where Πmon1 ,Π
mon
2 are the monopoly profits for SPs 1 and 2 respectively.
For the case of the Cournot competition, for any given q1, q2 the profits of the SPs are specified:
Π1(q1, q2) =
(
Q
q1 + q2
)1/ε
q1 − α1 − β1q1 (3)
Π2(q1, q2) =
(
Q
q1 + q2
)1/ε
q2 − α2 − β2q2 (4)
We first need to calculate the best response function for each provider. If SP2 offers to serve
demand q2, we show that the best response of SP1 is to set q1 so that q1/q2 is the solution to the
equation,
(z + 1)1+
1
ε = Az +B,
where A = (1 − 1ε )(Q/(q2βε1))1/ε and B = (Q/(q2βε1))1/ε, assuming that this leads to a positive
profit. We use qˆ1(q2) to denote this solution for any fixed value of q2. The best response function
for SP2 can be defined analogously.
Now that the best response functions are in place, we can calculate the Nash-Cournot solution
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which is given by,
t =
1− β2/β1(1− 1/ε)
β2/β1 − (1− 1/ε)
q∗1 = Q
(
1 + t(1− 1ε )
β2(1 + t)
1+ 1
ε
)ε
q∗2 = Q
(
1
t (1− 1ε ) + 1
β1(
1
t + 1)
1+ 1
ε
)ε
(We remark that in some cases this Nash Equilibrium may not exist if either q∗1 or q∗2 is negative
or if either of the corresponding profits are negative.)
As we saw in our running example, even if the Nash Equilibrium does exist an SP may have
an incentive to not play the Nash equilibrium solution but instead try to drive the other SP out of
the market. If SP1 wishes to be aggressive in this way then it sets q1 = q
′
1, where
q′1 = arg max
q1:Π2(q1,qˆ2(q1))≤0
{Π1(q1, 0)}.
(A similar expression can be derived for the aggressive strategy of SP2.) Since for the submission
strategy SP i simply sets qi = 0, we have now defined the values of q1, q2 for the cases of Nash-
Cournot, Aggression and Submission. For any problem instance we can then utilize the profit
functions of Equations (3) and (4) for each possible pair of strategies and combine the results with
the profits for sharing (given in Equations (1) and (2) in order to obtain a table of the form shown
in Figure 5.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a model to illustrate the options facing two Service Providers
who are deciding whether or not to share network infrastructure. Our cost function has a fixed
component and hence is non-convex. We presented a taxonomy of problem variants and derived
the profit for each SP both in the case that they share infrastructure as well as the case that they
are competitors. For the latter case the dynamics are complicated because the fixed cost function
gives an SP the option to be aggressive and try to drive the other SP out of the market. For our
running example the profit to each SP in the case of sharing is significantly higher than when they
compete fairly according to a Nash Equilibrium, and the profit is comparable to the case in which
the SP is aggressive and the other SP is submissive. For this example each SP would likely consider
sharing to be a better option since even if it plays agressively in a competitive setting there is no
way to ensure that the other SP would not try to be agressive as well.
A number of problems remain. In particular we would like to determine how the dynamics
would change if the two SPs only share a portion of the network infrastructure. We would also like
to incorporate roaming agreements into the model since they represent a “halfway” point between
total competition and full cooperation.
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A Detailed analysis of the Cournot competition
We now present our more detailed general analysis. We start with the competitive setting governed
by the Cournot game, in the which SPs compete by deciding how much demand they wish to serve.
Our analysis is more complex than the textbook Cournot analysis since the presence of the non-zero
αi parameters means that each SP is faced with a decision regarding whether or not to compete.
In the Cournot setting the price is determined by the aggregate demand, i.e.
pNC =
(
qNC1 + q
NC
2
Q
)−1/ε
,
We first consider a relaxation of the game in which the qi values can be negative and the profit is
always given by Πi = qipi − (αi + βiqi), regardless of whether or not it is positive. In this case we
assume that the quantities qNC1 , q
NC
2 are chosen so that they form a Nash equilibrium with respect
to the SP profits. Hence we wish to find a solution for which ∂Πi/∂qi = 0 for i = 1, 2.
Theorem 1. When the SPs compete on quantity in the relaxed Nash-Cournot game, the solution
is given by,
t =
1− β2/β1(1− 1/ε)
β2/β1 − (1− 1/ε)
q∗1 = Q
(
1 + t(1− 1ε )
β2(1 + t)
1+ 1
ε
)ε
q∗2 = Q
(
1
t (1− 1ε ) + 1
β1(
1
t + 1)
1+ 1
ε
)ε
pNC =
(
q∗1 + q∗2
Q
)−1/ε
ΠNC1 = Π1(q
∗
1, q
∗
2) =
(
Q
q∗1 + q∗2
)1/ε
q∗1 − α1 − β1q∗1
ΠNC2 = Π2(q
∗
1, q
∗
2) =
(
Q
q∗1 + q∗2
)1/ε
q∗2 − α2 − β2q∗2
Proof. For ease of notation we drop the superscript NC in this analysis. Define S := q1 + q2. The
solution is given by:
∂Π1(q1, q2)/∂q1 = 0 , (5)
that is,
S−(1+(1/ε))(S − q1/ε) = β1Q−1/ε , (6)
and
∂Π2(q1, q2)/∂q2 = 0 , (7)
that is,
S−(1+(1/ε))(S − q2/ε) = β2Q−1/ε . (8)
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For any fixed q2, we can solve Equation 6 according to:
(q1 + q2)
−(1+ 1
ε
)(q1(1− 1
ε
) + q2) = β1Q
− 1
ε
⇔ (q1 + q2)1+ε(q1(1− 1
ε
) + q2)
−ε = β−ε1 Q
⇔ q1+ε2 (
q1
q2
+ 1)1+εq−ε2 (
q1
q2
(1− 1
ε
) + 1)−ε = β−ε1 Q
⇔
 ( q1q2 + 1)1+ 1ε
q1
q2
(1− 1ε ) + 1
 = ( Q
q2βε1
)1/ε
.
In other words, q1/q2 is the solution to the equation,
(z + 1)1+
1
ε = Az +B,
where A = (1− 1ε )(Q/(q2βε1))1/ε and B = (Q/(q2βε1))1/ε. We use qˆ1(q2) to denote this solution for
any fixed value of q2.
For any fixed q1, we can solve Equation 8 according to:
(q1 + q2)
−(1+ 1
ε
)(q1 + q2(1− 1
ε
)) = β2Q
− 1
ε
⇔ (q1 + q2)1+ε(q1 + q2(1− 1
ε
))−ε = β−ε2 Q
⇔ q1+ε1 (1 +
q2
q1
)1+εq−ε1 (1 +
q2
q1
(1− 1
ε
))−ε = β−ε2 Q
⇔
 (1 + q2q1 )1+ 1ε
1 + q2q1 (1− 1ε )
 = ( Q
q1βε2
)1/ε
.
In other words, q2/q1 is the unique positive solution to the equation,
(1 + z)1+
1
ε = Az +B,
where A = (1− 1ε )(Q/(q1βε2))1/ε and B = (Q/(q1βε2))1/ε. We use qˆ2(q1) to denote this solution for
any fixed value of q1.
Suppose we now want to solve both Equations 6 and 8 simultaneously. By dividing the two
equations we have
β2(S − q1
ε
) = β1(S − q2
ε
)
⇒ β2
β1
(q1(1− 1
ε
) + q2) = q1 + q2(1− 1
ε
)
⇒ (1− β2
β1
(1− 1
ε
))q1 = (
β2
β1
− (1− 1
ε
))q2.
For β2/β1 6= (1− 1/ε), we have
q2 =
1− (β2/β1)(1− 1/ε)
β2/β1 − (1− 1/ε) q1 , (9)
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and so t := q2/q1 =
1−β2/β1(1−1/ε)
β2/β1−(1−1/ε) , which can be calculated by knowing the parameters ε, β1, β2.
If we let (q∗1, q∗2) be the solution to the simultaneous equations then it follows,
q∗1 = Q
(
1 + t(1− 1ε )
β2(1 + t)
1+ 1
ε
)ε
, (10)
and
q∗2 = Q
(
1
t (1− 1ε ) + 1
β1(
1
t + 1)
1+ 1
ε
)ε
. (11)
(The ratio q∗2/q∗1 indeed equals t). The corresponding profits are given by,
ΠNC1 := Π1(q
∗
1, q
∗
2) =
(
Q
q∗1 + q∗2
)1/ε
q∗1 − α1 − β1q∗1 , (12)
and
ΠNC2 := Π2(q
∗
1, q
∗
2) =
(
Q
q∗1 + q∗2
)1/ε
q∗2 − α2 − β2q∗2 . (13)
We now consider the real, i.e. non-relaxed problem and derive the conditions under which the
above Nash equilibrium is a valid solution. This is the case if q∗1, q∗2, Π1(q∗1, q∗2) and Π2(q∗1, q∗2) are
all non-negative. From the above analysis we immediately have,
Lemma 2. The pair (q∗1, q∗2) is a viable solution to the original problem if and only if,
(1− 1/ε) ≤ min{β1/β2, β2/β1},
α1 ≤
(
Q
q∗1 + q∗2
)1/ε
q∗1 − β1q∗1,
α2 ≤
(
Q
q∗1 + q∗2
)1/ε
q∗2 − β2q∗2.
Suppose that the conditions of Lemma 2 do not hold. Note that due to the unimodal nature
of the profit curve, if q∗i is negative then SP i would be better off setting qi = 0. Also, if Π
NC
i is
negative then SP i would be better off setting qi = 0. In each of these cases we say that SP i is
driven out of the market.
However, as we first discussed in Section 3.5, even if the Nash equilibrium is a viable solution
an SP may still be incentivized to try and drive the other SP out of the market. other SP out of
the market and so we now investigate that situation in detail. In particular let,
q′1 = arg max
q1:Π2(q1,qˆ2(q1))≤0
{Π1(q1, 0)}.
In other words, let q′1 be the value of q1 that maximizes the profit of SP1 assuming that it can drive
SP2 out of the market even if SP2 gives the best response. Similarly let,
q′2 = arg max
q2:Π1(qˆ1(q2),q2)≤0
{Π2(0, q2)}.
With these formulas in place, SP1 chooses from the following three options.
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• Option 1 (Nash-Cournot). Playing value q∗1 under the assumption that SP2 plays value q∗2.
This option is viable if all of the quantities, q∗1, q∗2, Π1(q∗1, q∗2) and Π2(q∗1, q∗2) are non-negative,
i.e. if the conditions of Lemma 2 hold.
• Option 2 (Aggression). Playing value q′1 with the expectation that SP2 plays value 0, (i.e. it
does not participate in the market).
• Option 3 (Submission). Playing value 0, i.e. not participating in the market.
SP2 is faced with an analogous set of options and so we obtain the following profit table in Figure 6
that is a general version of the first three columns and rows in Figure 5.
Nash-Cournot Aggression Submission
Nash-Cournot (Π1(q
∗
1, q
∗
2),Π2(q
∗
1, q
∗
2)) (Π1(q
∗
1, q
′
2),Π2(q
∗
1, q
′
2)) (Π1(q
∗
1, 0), 0)
Aggression (Π1(q
′
1, q
∗
2),Π2(q
′
1, q
∗
2) (Π1(q
′
1, q
′
2),Π2(q
′
1, q
′
2)) (Π1(q
′
1, 0), 0)
Submission (0,Π2(0, q
∗
2)) (0,Π2(0, q
′
2)) (0, 0)
Figure 6: The profits (Π1,Π2) due to the different strategy combinations. The rows represent the
decisions for SP1 and the columns represent the decisions for SP2.
B Network Sharing
We now examine the situation under network sharing. In this case the SPs cooperate and use the
lowest cost parameters that are available, i.e.
Ccoop(q) = αmin + βminq,
where αmin = min{α1, α2} and βmin = min{β1, β2}.
We first assume that the combined entity is able to use monopoly pricing. In this case the
combined price, demand and profit is given by,
pcoop = εβmin/(ε− 1)
qcoop = Q(εβmin/(ε− 1))−ε
Πcoop = pcoopqcoop − (αmin + βminqcoop)
It remains to determine how the profit is split between the SPs. A natural way to do this is via
the Shapley value which gives to SP i its expected contribution to the coalition assuming that the
SPs create the coalition in a random order. There are two ways to calculate this number depending
on whether we incorporate externalities [9, 10] from outside the coalition. More precisely, when SP
i is the first member of the coalition, we can either assume that it can utilize monopoly pricing or
we can assume that it still has to compete against the other SP according to the Nash-Cournot
game. The former case might be more appropriate in a rural setting in which an SP that enters
the market late is unlikely to participate in the market unless it can share. The latter case might
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be more appropriate in an urban situation in which both SPs feel compelled to enter the market
regardless of whether or not they can share. In the first case we get,
Πcoop1 =
1
2
(Πmon1 + Π
coop −Πmon2 )
Πcoop2 =
1
2
(Πmon2 + Π
coop −Πmon1 ).
In the latter case we get,
Πcoop1 =
1
2
(ΠNC1 + Π
coop −ΠNC2 )
Πcoop2 =
1
2
(ΠNC2 + Π
coop −ΠNC1 ).
(In Figure 1 these cases make up the “Cooperation→No regulator→Profit shared via Shap-
ley allocation” branches.)
From a regulator’s point of view, the downside of sharing under monopoly pricing is that the
price is significantly higher than the competitive case. We now look at an alternative framework
in which the price is restricted by a regulator to be the same as in the Nash-Cournot game. In this
setting the solution becomes,
pcoop = pNC
qcoop = Q(pNC)−ε
Πcoop = qcooppcoop − (αmin + βminqcoop).
Now when we consider the Shapley value without externalities, it only makes sense to assume that
the price is constrained to be the regulated price, regardless of the size of the coalition. Hence in
all cases the price and demand are the same and so the only difference between the coalitions is
the cost.
Πcoop1 =
1
2
(qcooppcoop − (α1 + αmin − α2)
−(β1 + βmin − β2)qcoop)
Πcoop2 =
1
2
(qcooppcoop − (α2 + αmin − α1)
−(β2 + βmin − β1)qcoop)
For the Shapley value with externalities we have,
Πcoop1 =
1
2
((qNC1 + q
coop − qNC2 )pcoop − (α1 + αmin − α2)
−(β1qNC1 + βminqcoop − β2qNC2 ))
Πcoop2 =
1
2
((qNC2 + q
coop − qNC1 )pcoop − (α2 + αmin − α1)
−(β2qNC2 + βminqcoop − β1qNC1 ))
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C Price competition and breaking the “Bertrand curse”
The results of Appendix A were for the Cournot notion of competition by offered capacity. Each
SP decides to serve demand qi and then the price is determined by the total capacity q1 + q2. The
main alternative notion of competition is a Bertrand competition in which the providers offer a
price to the market. In this section we examine how a price-based competition operates under
various notions of price-sensitivity for the end users. We start with the outcome of our running
example for the case of a Bertrand competition.
C.1 Bertrand analysis for the running example.
Recall our example from Section 3 in which the price elasticity function has parameters ε = 1.25
and Q = 1000. The per-unit capacity costs are β1 = $2.5M for SP1 and β2 = $2M for SP2 and
the fixed capacity costs are α1 = $50M and α2 = $100M .
We now consider the dynamics of this example under the simplest type of Bertrand game. If
the SPs offer different prices then all the demand goes to the one with the lowest price. If the two
SPs offer the same price then the demand is split between them. The value of the lowest price
determines the amount of demand in the market. In Figure 7 (left) we show the monopoly profit
Figure 7: (Left) The profit for the two SPs as a function of the price p. Here α1 = $50M ,
β1 = $2.5M , α2 = $100M and β2 = $2M . (Right) A blown up version of the figure.
function for these parameters as a function of price, p. We denote these functions by Πmon1 (p) and
Πmon2 (p). Figure 7 (right) shows a blown up version of the figure.
We see from the figure that Πmon1 (p) ≤ 0 for p ≤ 2.68 and Πmon2 (p) ≤ 0 for p ≤ 2.28. Hence
if p1 ≥ 2.68 then SP2 can always claim all the demand and gain a positive profit by setting
p2 =
1
2(p1 + 2.28). As a result, a natural strategy for SP2 is to set p2 slightly under 2.68 (e.g. at
2.67). This effectively drives SP1 out of the market since there is no setting for p1 that would allow
it to claim nonzero demand and make a positive profit. The resulting solution is:
p1 = $2.68M, q1 = 0PB, Π1 = $0M
p2 = $2.67M, q2 = 293PB, Π2 = $96.3M.
We now comment on the difference between the Bertrand and Cournot results and how they
compare to the sharing scenario.
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• In the Cournot game, each SP has the ability to drive the other out of the market. In the
Bertrand game, only SP2 can do that. The reason for this asymmetry in the Bertrand game
is that SP2 has a lower variable cost, i.e. β2 < β1. (For example, this might be due to SP2
having a lower cost for deploying capacity.) Hence SP2 can make a profit at a lower price
than SP1.
• If competition is modeled according to a Bertrand game, SP2 is better off sharing with SP1
than driving SP1 out of the market. In contrast, if competition is modeled according to a
Cournot game, both SPs can do better than sharing if they are able to drive the other SP
out of the market.
• With the Bertrand game, if SP2 drives SP1 out of the market, there is no action of SP1
that would cause SP2 to have a negative profit. In contrast, in the Cournot game if one SP
is aggressive and tries to drive the other out of the market, the aggressive SP is in danger
of making a negative profit if the other SP refuses to be submissive and also decides to act
aggressively.
We now provide a general analysis of the Bertrand game. In Section C.2 we examine the basic
Bertrand model and then in Section C.3 we show how the results change when not all users are price
sensitive. This type of model has been considered as one way of breaking the “Bertrand curse”
which occurs when both providers have the same costs and so neither can achieve a profit. In
Section C.4 we consider another extension of the basic model that is motivated by potential actions
of a regulator. In this extension (that is a combination of the sharing model and the Bertrand
game) the SPs are allowed to share costs but the regulator enforces that they must still compete
on price.
C.2 Bertrand model 1: all end users are price sensitive
In this simplest case we assume that all demand goes to the SP that offers the lowest price and
if both SPs offer the same price then the demand is split between them. Suppose that the αi, βi
parameters are fixed.
• αi ≥ Q((εβi/(ε− 1))1−ε − β1−εi (ε/(ε− 1))−ε) for i = 1, 2. In this case a Nash equilibrium is
for both SPs to stay out of the market and keep a profit of zero. This is because neither can
attain a positive profit, even if they can act as a monopoly.
• If the above condition does not hold for SP i, let p
i
= min{p : Qp1−ε − (αi + βiQp−ε) ≥ 0}
and let p¯i = max{p : Qp1−ε − (αi + βiQp−ε) ≥ 0}. Suppose without loss of generality that
p
1
≥ p
2
. If p¯2 ≤ p1 then a Nash equilibrium is for SP2 to set price p2 = pmon2 and for SP1 to
stay out of the market.
• If p¯2 > p1 and p2 < p1 (i.e. with strict inequality) then a natural solution is for SP2 to set
price p2 = min p
mon
2 , p1 and for SP1 to stay out of the market. Note that this is not a Nash
equilibrium in the strict sense since if SP1 does not participate then the optimal action of SP2
is to set its price to its monopoly price. However, if SP2 did that then SP1 could potentially
get back into the market. Hence a more natural course of action for SP2 is to set its price to
the best price that keeps SP1 out of the market.
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• If p
2
= p
1
then it is not hard to see that the only Nash equilibrium is for both SPs to set price
pi = pi which gives them zero profit. This is an example of the so-called Bertrand curse in
which either one provider is driven completely out of the market or else both providers make
zero profit.
C.3 Bertrand model 2: not all end users are price sensitive
The Bertrand curse is generally viewed as a an undesirable state of affairs and so there has been
much research on methods to avoid it. We now consider how our results change in a framework of
Bagwell and Lee [2] that was inspired by earlier work Varian [14]. In this model we assume that a
fraction I of the end users (the “informed” users) are price sensitive and a fraction U = 1− I (the
“uninformed” users) are price insensitive. However, each end user still generates demand based on
price according to the price elasticity function. Let,
Π+i (p) = (I +
U
2
)pq(p)− (αi + βiq(p))
Π−i (p) =
U
2
pq(p)− (αi + βiq(p))
In other words, Π+i (p) is the profit function when SP i has the low price and Π
−
i (p) is the profit
function when SP i has the high price. Let [p−
i
, p¯−i ] be the price range on which Π
−
i is non-negative
and let [p+
i
, p¯+i ] be the price range on which Π
+
i is non-negative. We assume without loss of
generality that p+
2
≤ p+
1
.
For this case we claim that the following is a stable solution. SP1 sets its price p1 so as
to maximize Π−1 . Now let pˆ1 ≤ p1 be such that Π+1 (pˆ1) = Π−1 (p1). SP2 sets its price p2 =
min{pˆ1, arg max Π+2 (p)}.
We show that this solution is a stable solution in the following sense. First of all, given the
price offered by SP2, SP1 cannot improve its profit with any other price. Hence it satisfies the
property of a Nash equilbrium from the perspective of SP1. It does not satsify the property of a
Nash equilibrim from the perspective of SP2 since SP2 could potentially increase its profit if SP1
keeps its price fixed. However, if SP2 did that then SP1 could choose a new price in which SP1
does better and SP2 does worse. Another way to look at this is that these prices form a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for the Stackelberg game in which SP2 sets its price first and then SP1
follows.
C.4 Sharing on cost with price competition
When considering the benefits of sharing in the context of a Bertrand competition, one model of
sharing would be exactly as was considered before in the context of a Nash Cournot competition.
The service providers provide capacity based on the minimum of their costs and then calculate
a monopoly price with respect to those costs. The above notion of a Bertrand competition with
insensitive users gives rise to another notion of sharing that might be more appealing to a regulator.
In particular, the SPs are allowed to cooperate on cost when building capacity. However, when
offering service to end users they must still compete on price. This gives rise to a Bertrand
competition in which each SP has parameters αmin = min{α1, α2} and βmin = min{β1, β2}. In the
case of a Bertrand competition in which all users are price sensitive, both SPs would offer a price
p = βmin and so neither would generate a profit. However, for the case in which some users are
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price insensitive, there is a stable situation as described above in which one SP offers a low price
in order to get all the price sensitive users while the other one offers a high price in order to get all
the price insensitive users.
D Multiple Geographic Regions
One of the main reasons that regulators allow network sharing even though it leads to loss of
competition is that it allows service providers to more quickly offer service over a large geographic
region. In order to investigate this phenomenon, we now show how our analysis extends when it is
not the case that both SPs can offer service by themselves over the entire market. For this analysis
we focus on the specific SP cost parameters given in Section 3.
We consider two scenarios, both of which have two regions W and E. In the first scenario SP1
can provide service in region W (with its α value halved to represent fixed costs in one region only),
and SP2 can provide service in region E (with its α value also halved). There are three types of
user, W, E and WE. WE users need a service provider that can provide service in both regions.
Hence if the SPs do not cooperate then these users cannot be served. Let NX be the fraction of
users of type X. For our numerical example we assume that NW = NE = NWE =
1
3 .
In the case without sharing there is no competition and we have,
pmon1 = $12.5M, q
mon
1 = 14.18PB, Π
mon
1 = $116.82M
pmon2 = $10M, q
mon
2 = 18.74PB, Π
mon
2 = $99.96M
In the case of cooperation we assume that each SP builds the network in its “own” region but
the two SPs cooperate on price over the entire market. Hence the combined entity has a monopoly
with parameters (α1, β1) in the W region and a monopoly with parameters (α2, β2) in the E region.
Thus,
pcoop = $11.25M, qcoop = 48.54PB, Πcoop = $362M
Hence from the Shapley value we have,
Πcoop1 =
1
2
(116.82 + 362− 99.96) = $189.43M
Πcoop2 =
1
2
(99.96 + 362− 116.82) = $172.57M
In the second scenario we assume initally that SP1 can only serve users in the W region but
SP2 can serve users in both the W and E regions. Hence SP2 has a monopoly on both the E users
and the WE users. For these two sets of users we have,
p2 = $10M, q2 = 37.49PB
For the W users we have a competition between the SPs. If it is a Nash-Cournot competition then
we have:
pNC1 = $3.75M, q
NC
1 = 26.62PB
pNC2 = $3.75M, q
NC
2 = 37.26PB
The total profit in this case is:
ΠNC1 = $8.28M, Π
NC
2 = $265M
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If it is a Bertrand competition then SP2 is always incentivized to compete since it acts as a monopoly
for the E and WE users. Hence it sets its price to the minimum that drives SP1 out of the market
for the W users, i.e. we have,
pB1 = $3.75M, q
B
1 = 0PB, Π
B
1 = $0M
pB2 ∈ {$2.77M, $10M}, qB2 = 130.77PB, ΠB2 = $272M
where pB2 = $2.77M for the W users and p
B
2 = $10M for the WE and E users. For the cooperative
solution the SPs have to use the SP2 parameters in the E region but they can use the optimum of
the SP1 and SP2 parameters in the W region. Hence in this case we have,
pcoop = $11.25M, qcoop = 48.54PB, Πcoop = $362M.
In order to calculate the Shapley value to split the profit we need to know the individual monopoly
values in this case.
pmon1 = $12.5M, q
mon
1 = 14.18PB, Π
mon
1 = $117M
pmon2 = $10.0M, q
mon
2 = 56.2PB, Π
mon
2 = $350M.
Hence,
Πcoop1 =
1
2
(117 + 362− 350) = $64.5M
Πcoop2 =
1
2
(350 + 362− 117) = $297.5M
E Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. In the following we drop the mon superscript. We determine the solution by setting dΠ/dq =
0. Recall our assumption that ε > 1.2
Π =
q1−(1/ε)
Q−1/ε
− (α+ βq)
dΠ
dq
=
ε− 1
ε
q−1/ε
Q−1/ε
− β.
Hence dΠdq = 0 if and only if,
q−1/ε
Q−1/ε
= β
ε
ε− 1
⇔ q = Q
(
εβ
ε− 1
)−ε
⇔ p =
(
Q
Q
(
βε
ε− 1
)−ε)−1/ε
⇔ p = βε
ε− 1
2We assume ε > 1 since otherwise the SPs would be incentivized to set an arbitrarily high price.
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